Summary
When generating a support bundle with talosctl support the credentials entered for private registries are included in the bundle.
Details
Within the generated support bundle, inside resources/registryconfigs.cri.talos.dev.yaml the auth field of the spec is retained.
The same, potentially sensitive information is present within etcfilespecs.files.talos.dev.yaml.
PoC
Simply run talosctl -n [...] support on a cluster with a RegistryAuthConfig resource
Impact
The problem itself is minor, however, anyone who has ever uploaded a support.zip bundle on a github issue, slack thread or public forum could have potentially leaked their internal authentication parameters for a private registry.
In most situations, if the network and credentials are set correctly, this should not be a problem. On the other hand, if the affected registry is publicly accessible, and the provided credentials have write access to it, this could lead to possibly serious consequences, from denial of service, to data loss and possibly existing tag hijacking leading to supply chain compromise, for the affected parties which were under the impression that the support bundle is redacted of sensitive information and thus can be shared publicly.
Notes
Talos 1.14+ by default encrypts the support bundle to the age recipients specified (defaulting to siderolabs GitHub org members), so the impact is even lower.
Environment
- Talos version: v1.13.0
- Kubernetes version: 1.35.3
- Platform: amd64
References
Thanzex Reporter
zuhairhalawa Analyst
Summary
When generating a support bundle with
talosctl supportthe credentials entered for private registries are included in the bundle.Details
Within the generated support bundle, inside
resources/registryconfigs.cri.talos.dev.yamltheauthfield of the spec is retained.The same, potentially sensitive information is present within
etcfilespecs.files.talos.dev.yaml.PoC
Simply run
talosctl -n [...] supporton a cluster with aRegistryAuthConfigresourceImpact
The problem itself is minor, however, anyone who has ever uploaded a support.zip bundle on a github issue, slack thread or public forum could have potentially leaked their internal authentication parameters for a private registry.
In most situations, if the network and credentials are set correctly, this should not be a problem. On the other hand, if the affected registry is publicly accessible, and the provided credentials have write access to it, this could lead to possibly serious consequences, from denial of service, to data loss and possibly existing tag hijacking leading to supply chain compromise, for the affected parties which were under the impression that the support bundle is redacted of sensitive information and thus can be shared publicly.
Notes
Talos 1.14+ by default encrypts the support bundle to the age recipients specified (defaulting to siderolabs GitHub org members), so the impact is even lower.
Environment
References