The Wp Social Login and Register Social Counter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.2. This is due to the social login REST callback registered at /wp-json/wslu-social-login/type/{provider}/ with permission_callback => __return_true locating an existing WordPress account solely by the email string returned from the OAuth provider and calling wp_set_auth_cookie() without a password check, while the only verification guard — !empty($getProfile->emailVerified) in inc/admin-create-user.php — is a no-op for the bundled Hybridauth Facebook and Twitter adapters, both of which assign the raw email string rather than a boolean verified flag to emailVerified. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain a fully authenticated session as any existing WordPress user, including Administrators, whose registered email address can be presented through a configured Facebook or Twitter login on the target site. Exploitation requires only that the attacker control an OAuth account whose provider-returned email matches the target account's registered WordPress email address; no local credentials, nonce, or prior foothold is needed.
References
The Wp Social Login and Register Social Counter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.2. This is due to the social login REST callback registered at
/wp-json/wslu-social-login/type/{provider}/withpermission_callback => __return_truelocating an existing WordPress account solely by the email string returned from the OAuth provider and callingwp_set_auth_cookie()without a password check, while the only verification guard —!empty($getProfile->emailVerified)ininc/admin-create-user.php— is a no-op for the bundled Hybridauth Facebook and Twitter adapters, both of which assign the raw email string rather than a boolean verified flag toemailVerified. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain a fully authenticated session as any existing WordPress user, including Administrators, whose registered email address can be presented through a configured Facebook or Twitter login on the target site. Exploitation requires only that the attacker control an OAuth account whose provider-returned email matches the target account's registered WordPress email address; no local credentials, nonce, or prior foothold is needed.References