Draft text for GHSA-qw47-mcm5-934w. The body below drops into the GitHub advisory description
field; the metadata block maps to the form fields. Set the patched version at release; publish
when the fix ships._
- Ecosystem: Maven
- Affected package:
org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-server-common (task store / authorization)
- Affected versions:
<= 1.2.0.Final (and 1.2.1.Final-SNAPSHOT on main prior to the fix)
- Patched version: (the release that carries the fix, e.g. 1.2.1.Final)
- CWE: CWE-1188 (Insecure Default Initialization), CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)
- Severity: High
- CVSS v3.1:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (7.5, High)
Details
The default task store performs no authorization on task reads. InMemoryTaskStore's no-arg
constructor sets authorizationProvider = null, and InMemoryTaskStore.get(String taskId) is a
bare map lookup with no authorization check regardless of provider:
public InMemoryTaskStore() {
this.authorizationProvider = null; // default wiring
}
@Override
public @Nullable Task get(String taskId) {
return tasks.get(taskId); // no owner / caller check
}Authorization is enforced only when the application both supplies a TaskAuthorizationProvider
and routes requests through AuthorizationRequestHandlerDecorator (via CDI), which checks
ownership before delegating. A server that uses the default store, or wires
DefaultRequestHandler.builder().build() manually, or integrates through a non-CDI stack (e.g.
Spring), never reaches that check. The safe posture is therefore opt-in and the shipped default is
the unsafe one. A caller can read a task created by another caller simply by knowing or guessing
its id.
Summary
With the SDK's default configuration, task reads are not authorized: any caller can retrieve a
task (including its status, context, message history, and artifacts) created by another caller,
by supplying the task id.
PoC
Using only the real production classes wired the default way (no mocks):
- Construct the default store:
InMemoryTaskStore store = new InMemoryTaskStore(); (no-arg
constructor, so no authorization provider).
- As one caller, save a task:
store.save(victimTask, false); with id victim-task-42.
- As a second, unrelated caller with no auth context, read it back:
store.get("victim-task-42").
The second caller receives the first caller's task in full, with no authorization check:
unauthenticated get(victim-task-42) returned task owned by nobody-checked: victim-task-42 / ctx=victim-ctx
Verified on main (commit 72d220c, JDK 21) and reproduces unchanged on 1.2.0.Final.
Impact
Task data crosses caller boundaries with no authorization. In any multi-caller deployment built on
the default wiring, one caller can enumerate and read another caller's tasks, including task status,
context id, the message history, and any artifacts the task carries, which for agent workloads is
frequently sensitive input and generated content. Because the insecure behaviour is the default
rather than a misconfiguration, it is easy to ship unintentionally, and in the default/reference
deployment the transport endpoints are served without authentication enforced, so the read is
reachable by an unauthenticated caller (PR:N). CVSS is scored against the default configuration
as shipped.
Remediation
Fail closed by default: deny task reads when no authorization provider is configured, rather than
treating a missing provider as allow-all, and apply the authorization check in the store's get
path (not only in list and the CDI decorator) so it holds regardless of how the handler is
wired. If the current permissive default is retained for single-user/testing scenarios, emit a
prominent startup warning when the server comes up with no authorization provider so it cannot be
shipped by accident.
Workarounds
Until a fixed release, configure a TaskAuthorizationProvider and ensure requests are routed
through the authorization decorator (CDI wiring), rather than relying on the default no-arg store
or a manually built handler.
References
References
asishinfosec Finder
Draft text for GHSA-qw47-mcm5-934w. The body below drops into the GitHub advisory description
field; the metadata block maps to the form fields. Set the patched version at release; publish
when the fix ships._
org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-server-common(task store / authorization)<= 1.2.0.Final(and1.2.1.Final-SNAPSHOTonmainprior to the fix)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N(7.5, High)Details
The default task store performs no authorization on task reads.
InMemoryTaskStore's no-argconstructor sets
authorizationProvider = null, andInMemoryTaskStore.get(String taskId)is abare map lookup with no authorization check regardless of provider:
Authorization is enforced only when the application both supplies a
TaskAuthorizationProviderand routes requests through
AuthorizationRequestHandlerDecorator(via CDI), which checksownership before delegating. A server that uses the default store, or wires
DefaultRequestHandler.builder().build()manually, or integrates through a non-CDI stack (e.g.Spring), never reaches that check. The safe posture is therefore opt-in and the shipped default is
the unsafe one. A caller can read a task created by another caller simply by knowing or guessing
its id.
Summary
With the SDK's default configuration, task reads are not authorized: any caller can retrieve a
task (including its status, context, message history, and artifacts) created by another caller,
by supplying the task id.
PoC
Using only the real production classes wired the default way (no mocks):
InMemoryTaskStore store = new InMemoryTaskStore();(no-argconstructor, so no authorization provider).
store.save(victimTask, false);with idvictim-task-42.store.get("victim-task-42").The second caller receives the first caller's task in full, with no authorization check:
Verified on
main(commit72d220c, JDK 21) and reproduces unchanged on1.2.0.Final.Impact
Task data crosses caller boundaries with no authorization. In any multi-caller deployment built on
the default wiring, one caller can enumerate and read another caller's tasks, including task status,
context id, the message history, and any artifacts the task carries, which for agent workloads is
frequently sensitive input and generated content. Because the insecure behaviour is the default
rather than a misconfiguration, it is easy to ship unintentionally, and in the default/reference
deployment the transport endpoints are served without authentication enforced, so the read is
reachable by an unauthenticated caller (
PR:N). CVSS is scored against the default configurationas shipped.
Remediation
Fail closed by default: deny task reads when no authorization provider is configured, rather than
treating a missing provider as allow-all, and apply the authorization check in the store's
getpath (not only in
listand the CDI decorator) so it holds regardless of how the handler iswired. If the current permissive default is retained for single-user/testing scenarios, emit a
prominent startup warning when the server comes up with no authorization provider so it cannot be
shipped by accident.
Workarounds
Until a fixed release, configure a
TaskAuthorizationProviderand ensure requests are routedthrough the authorization decorator (CDI wiring), rather than relying on the default no-arg store
or a manually built handler.
References
References